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I INTRODUCTION 
As balance of payments difficulties have continued to 
plague most LDC's (with the exception of some of the major 
petroleum-producing countries), most LDC's have been forced 
to adopt, a.t least implicitly, a strategy for attaining rapid 
growth within the confines of a severe balance of payments 
constraint. Most LDC's have opted for one 6f'two such strategies 
-- the import substitution strategy (in which tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions and multiple exchange rates have played a large 
role) or the IMF-supported package of monetary and fiscal austerity. 
Ten years ago many countries might have looked to foreign 
aid as a means of be.lancing payments and, at the same time, 
channelling foreign resources into their economic development. 
However, the prospect for this rather pleasant alternative is 
not nearly as bright as it was then, and it is evidpnt that 
much of the adjustment must take place within and be achieved 
by the LDC's themselves. Furthermore, as time passes, it becomes 
increasingly clear that neither of these alternative strat,gies 
appears to have been successful in allowing many of the LDC's 
to sustain what might be regarded as satisfactory growth in 
terms of per capita income or virtually any other index of 
development over a period as long as two decades. In addition, 
there has been increasing recognition of the additional costs in 
terms of allocative and dynamic efficiency and ot administrative 
capability ot the import substitution strategy via exchange 
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1control on the one hand, and in terms ot structural rigidity, 
product concentration and income distribution associated with 
2fiscal and monetary austerity on the other. These rather disappointing 
results have, in a number of· instan4!es~r.ibeen achieved·'~n with rather 
generous amounts of toreign assistance. 
Indeed, the few LDC' s that have sustained rapid growth in 
the postwar period -- such as Israel, Greece, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, 
Spain and possibly Portugal, Zambia, and Peru3 -- would each seem 
to have departed significantly from the more commonly adopted "import-
subatitution~ or''"IMF-elasiHca.I".-strategies· by.. leaning towElt'ds •exbhan~e 
ra~e-oriented policy packages emphasizing export promotion. Partly as 
as result of this experience increasing attention has been devoted at 
both the empirical and theoretical levels to the role of exchange rate 
policy in the economic development of LDC's. 4 Nevertheless, it would 
be dangerous if not foolish, to argue that the difference in growth 
performance of the several rapidly growing LDC's listed above from 
that of all the other LDC's could or should be attributed entirely to 
a difference in the strategy of meeting their pers1sting balance of 
1.Among others in a rapidly growing critique of import substitution 
are Gustav Ranis [85 ], David Felix [ 36] and Scitovsky [ 93 ]. 
2E.g., see Lauchlin Currie [ 27 J 
3According to AID (102] and OECD [ 79] statistics, these are the 
only LDC's (other than the larger petroleum producers) that would seem 
to have doubled their per capita incomes since 1950. 
4Among the empirical studies which have attempted to relate ex­
change rate policy to export performance are those of Sheahan and Clark 
[ 94 ] , Urdinola and Mallon [107 ] and Johnson [ 56 ] :for Colombia, 
Clark [ 20] for Brazil, Islam 54] for Pakistan, Baba and Tatemoto 
[ 5] for Japan, Nugent and DePrano [ 78 J for Ecuador, and on an 
international cross-section basis that of DeVries [ 29 ]. Cooper [ 26] 
has attempted to assess the short run impact on the balance of payments 
of 24 devaluations in 19 different LDC's. In contrut to the rather 
voluminous theoretical literature relating exchange rates with balance 
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payments problems. Indeed, each of these countries would seem to 
have enjoyed very special advantages in terms of external assistance, 
geographical location and a considerable amount of good luck. 
Any attempt to separate the effects of these various factors is 
likely to be beset by a number of difft~ult methodological problems 
stemming from tlE fact that almost nothing is constant or completely 
exogenous in the long run. For one thing, exchange rates -- even pegged 
ones -- are not entirely exogenous in the long run. Since countries 
with excellent export growth will be less likely to devaluate than 
countries with slower export growth, any attempt to estimate the impact 
of exchange rates policy (as measured by the ~rice of foreign exchange 
in terms of domestic currency) on exports -- a relationship that should 
be positive -- would be subject to a negative bias of possibly sizeable 
magnitude due to the presence of a simultaneous and negative relation­
ship between export growth and exchange rates. Another problem is that 
devaluations are often accompanied by various kinds of reforms, such as 
import liberalization (a relaxation of import duties and/or quantitative 
restrictions on imports) or exchange rate unification (a movement away 
from multiple exchange rates), or by simultaneous attempts to complement 
or compensate for the effects of devaluation by monetary and fiscal 
constraint, increased export taxes, etc. Still another complexity that 
has not been sufficiently appreciated is the fact that, although exchange 
rate policy may operate both on the supply of exports andon the denuuia for 
exports, the precise way in which it operates on each of these factors 
may differ. Thus, while it may be the exchange rate relative to the 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
of payments adjustments, a rather unique theoretical study relating 
exchange rate policy with economic growth is that of Baldwin [ 7 ]. 
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ratio of export prices of the country is to those of the rest of the 
world that is relevanu in the demand for exports, it may be the ex­
change rate and export prices of the country ~re relative'lto"other.jrices 
of country is that are relevant to the supply of exports. It is no 
wonder, then that previous attempts to demonstrate the impact of ex­
change rate policy on export performance primarily in the 1ostwar period 
(in which the feedback has been q~ite evident) have not been entirely 
successful. 
The purpose of this pape~ is to explore the relationship between 
exchange rate policy on the one hand, and export performance and 
economic growth, on the other hand, during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. This period offers particular advantages in over­
coming at least some of the methodological problems which beset 
similar investigations in subsequent periods. This was a period in 
which the vast majority of the countries of the world were explicitly 
or implicitly committed to either the silver standard or the gold 
standard. Since the price of silver in terms of gold fell rather 
steadily between 187~ and 1894 (as shown in Table l) due both to 
relative changes in supply conditions in the producing countries and 
to relative changes in demand conditions {especially as more and more 
countries switched away from the silver to gold and paper currencies) 
this meant a more or less gradual implicit devaluation by the countries 
of approxmmately 50% over these two decades. 
What is important to realize is that this kind of de facto de­
valuation on the part of each of the silver standard countries with 
respect to each of the gold standard countries was largely unintention­
al and was totally independent of the balance of payments positions, of 
any individual country and therefore was not prompted by poor export 
performance of any particular country. This means that any estimate 
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(1) Source: Study of' Silver Values and Commodity Prices, Ministry of 
Industries (23, Table 1, pp. 2-4.] 
(2) Source: Patrick [ 80, Table 2, p. 197] 
(3) Source: Mexico [ 73, p. 153] 
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ot the effect of devaluation on export growth during the 1873-18~5 
period will be free of the previously-mentioned negative bias which 
arises when there is a negative feedback effect from export performance 
to exchange rate in the long run. Since, even among less developed 
countries there were a relatively large number of countries on each 
type ot metal standard (and still others with inconvertible paper 
currencies), we can obtain a fairly large number of observations of the 
effect of an identical devaluation under the same set of conditions. A 
third advantage is that by and large this was a period of peace in the 
world and one in which tariif and quantitative restrictions, multiple 
exchange rates and other complicating factors playei a very minor role 
in international trade. 
An outline of one 0f the possible ways in which €X~hange between 
rate policy may promote development is presented in Section II. Since 
the effects of exchange depreciation during the same period of time 
has been the subject of a number of previous studies, in Section III 
we gi~e a brief critical account of some of these studies. In Sections 
IV and V, we contrast the export performance and growth performance, 
respectively of countries (primarily LDC's) on the silver and gold 
standards. Some conclusions and qualifications are stated in Section VL. 
II THEORY 
Without doubt the most important and direct effect that exchange 
rate devaluation should have is on exports. It would seem likely that 
it should be primarily through its affect on exports that exchange rate 
policy would effect capital formation, efficiency, output and employ­
ment. 
The hypothesized effect on exports may be illustrated by Figure 1. 
Domestic demand is given by Dd, foreign demand by df, total de~and by 
ABDt end domestic supply by s1 -- all stated 1n terms of the domestic 0 
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currency (pesos). If perfect competition is assumed in all markets, s1 
will intersect the total demand curve in the segment AB that is made 
up entirely of domestic demand. Equilibrium is therefore at the 
price Po and domestic demand is d and there are no exports. A 
0 
devaluation of CE will shift the foreign demand curve to Df and 
OE 
hence total demand to Dt. Equilibrium. is now at P1and t 1 , domestic 
cons~~tion now at d1 , and (t - d1 ) is exported. Continued devaluation1 
would shift Df further outward and exports would continue to grow and 
domestic consumption of exportables would eventually disappear. 
However, (a la Smith and others) the increase in the size of the market 
would be likely to induce complementary investments, resource shifts, 
external economies and technological changes sufficient to shift the 
domestic supply curve outward over time to s2 which would yield a new 
equilibrium at P2 and t in which both domestic consumption and exports2 
would increase to d2 and (t2 - d2 ), respectively. This increase in the 
size of the market would be likely to shift Dd and S out further, etc ••• 
The alternative strategy which we have previously labeled "IMF• 
classical", would be to shift Dd downward to Dd via contractionary 
monetary and fiscal, policies. This strategy would create some exports 
(e ) but domestic demand would be eliminated and hence with a smaller
3 
total market, it would be unlikely that the supply curve would be 
shifted outward over time as in the previous case. (In fact the supply 
curve might very well shift inward over time so that the incentive to 
exports via the ;;Il-1F-classical 11 strategy would turn, out to be short­
lived). 
While it is possible to conceive of supply and demand conditions 
in which devaluation would not have such a pronounced effect on ex­
ports, Figure l should be sufficient to point out that in the long-run 
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policy which may be analyzed in terms of elasticity and/or 
absorption conditions, are likely to be swamped by the less 
tractible dynamic effects. 
As the devaluating country (or countries) moves its 
resources in such a way as to increase the allocation of re-
sources to the areas of its comparative advantage {which undoubtedly 
would be changing over time), aggregate allocative efficiency would 
increase. The rise in the rate of growth of exports would be likely 
to permit some relaxation of quantitative restrictions on imports 
and thereby increase the number of areas in which domestic producers 
would face competition from the outside world. Furthermore, a more 
rapid rate of growth is likely to induce a greater-·number of competitors 
into the market. As competition increases, allocative efficiency would 
be improved. The increase in allocative efficiency both from move­
ment toward comparative advantage and increased competition would 
raise income and hence savings and investment probably faster than the 
rate of growth income. Foreign capital (and possibly other foreign 
resources) would likely he induced by the expansion of the economy.and 
increased investment opportunities especially i~ the export sect9rs 
in which foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs are likely to feel most 
comfortable. The increased capital stock (and perhaps other factor 
accumulations) would increase potential output. The new capital goods 
(perhaps embodyin~ technological change) and the expanding size of the 
markets would induce technological chanr;e (or dynamic eff'icien·cy) 
associated with and derived from internal and external economies at the 
micro level. 
Increased output from these sources, and from the effect of 
devaluation on the price of investment ~oods (lar~ely i~ported) relative 
to wages (which would depend largely on the price of home goods) would 
-8-
increase the demand for labor and hence employment would be expected 
to grow without necessarily depending on money illusion on the part of 
the workers. 
Connections between continuous devaluation t.nd growth otber·thlln 
those briefly sketched here are also possible. For example, devaluation 
can effect income distribution and thereby influence savings and import 
propensities5 • Devaluations can also influence prices and hence the 
real value of assets and desired assets, the relative rates of return 
6 
on financial and real assets and hence savings and investment rates • 
Also via the effect on exports and hence money supply and interest 
rates (in a mercantilist world) exchange rate policy could affect 
investment and growth. Te1ms of trade effects on growth rate policy, 
and repercussions thereof, would also have various kinds of effects on 
growth in the long run7• Since a variety of possible mechanisms would 
seem likely to exist, a large and rather sophisticated model would seem 
to be required to integrate and test the relative significance of the 
various possible ways in which exchange rate policy may affect growth. 
It would therefore seem wise to seek empirical support for an overall 
effect of currency devaluation on econorric growth before going about the 
model building. This would seem part lcularly warranted in view of the 
previous empirical findinGS {to be discussed in the next section) which 
have not always supported the existence of such a relationship. 
5see Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro [ 30 J 
6see lTurray Kemp [ 58 1 
7See s. c. Tsiang [ 98 ] 
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III A CRITICAL SURVEY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE 
EFFECTS OF THE FALL IN SILVER PRICES ON DEVELOPL1ENT 
OF SILVER STANDARD COUNTRIES 
or the studies and commissions established to investigate the 
effect of the depreciation of silver on economic c?nditions in both silver 
and gold standard countries some have produced results emphasizing the 
benefits of currency devaluation and some have concluded that on balance 
the effects were largely negative. Although probably a majority of the 
studies undertaken in the silver countries revealed.net benefits of the 
steady depreciation of silver in terms of gold, almost all those ., 
undertaken in gold standard countries revealed some of the obvious dis­
advantages of currency appreciation8 , the studies which have attracted 
the most attention have been those which concluded that implicit exchange 
devaluation had not been unfavorable to the orderly economic development 
of certain of the silver countries. Particularly influential among 
these studies were those of the subcommittee of the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce of 1897 and the Straits Settlements Currency Committee of 
1902 referring to the experience of the Straits Settlements and Hala.,va 
8For example, there were the views of the Mexican delegation to the 
Brussels conference of 1892: 11The depreciation of silver as it appeared 
to foreign countries --- has produced an actual premium on exportation. 
Articles which were not exported formerly are sold now in the markets of 
Europe and the United States 11 ( Q,uoted in Hussell [ 91, p. 398]. Among 
other favorable reports in silver countries were those of the lfinister 
of Finance in Chile, reported in Fetter [ 38], Kernmener's study of 
T'iexico [ 57 , p. 479-483], the Silver Currency Commission (Swettenham 
Commission) in Ceylon of 1893 reported in Gunasekera [ 48 ], the French 
Ministerial Commission on Indochina in 1902 reported in Thin [ 97 ] 
and of the Japanese Commission reported in Leavins [ 62, p. 110]. Among 
those indicating unfavorable effects of currency appreciation in aold 
standard was that of the Berlin Silver Commission 1893-4 and similar 
conclusions were no doubt the inspiration of the International Conferences 
of 1878 and 1881 reported in Leavins [ 62 ] • Uhile the Ministry of 
Industries study in China crune out against silveri:Ln:.1935 [ 23 ] , it 
is signit.icant to note that this conclusion was prompted not b,1 the 
depreciation or silver 1920-1931 but the subsequent sharp appreciation 
of silver 1932-35. 
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(reported in Kemmerer [ 57 ] ) , the reports of the Herschell Committee 
of 1893 [ 57 ] and of the Fowler Committee of 1898 [ 39 ] and aleo 
Remer' s study of China [ 87 ] • The findings of these studies were 
indeed quite negative. 
In the Herschell Committee Report 'I-Te f.ind the following conclusion: 
0 Upon the whole we cannot see any evidence that the effect 
of a falline exchange on the country at large, in influencing either 
exports or imports, has over a series of years been very considerable." 
[ 51 ] 
And from the subsequent Fowler Committee the following equally 
strong conclusion emerged: 
iiwe desire to state that ue have been unable to find any 
statistical support for the theory that exports are largely and perman­
ently stimulated by a depreciation of the standard of value, resulting 
in a fall in the exchange." [39] 
These conclusions are indeed sufficiently strong to demand some 
explanation if the rough reodel sketched above is to be given any credence. 
Each one of these c,mmittees, cJmmissions or studies presented findings 
particular to the sin~le country concerned an1 hence to a certain extent 
the empirical eviden::e presented would have to be examined in detail 
on a country by country basis -- a(~aek of excessive m~gnitude for a 
study of ffiis scope. Fortunately, in reading through them one can easily 
see that the kinds of arguments presented in support;/ •of ··their conclusions 
were largely the same for ea.ch of these studies arid hence tlie- :,;al'.idfty 
of their conclusions can be evaluated in terms of the logic of their 
arguments which can be sumfu.arized and crii.ticized as foiiows: 
(l) First , it wS:s contended in several of those countries that 
·" 
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imports grew faster than exports9 . While in the static sense alone this 
should indeed be the antithesis of the expected effect of currency 
depreciation on the balance of payments, which would presumably be to 
assist exports and promote import substitution, in ~he dynamic context 
(which would seem to be relevant to a period as long as two decades) the 
~apital goods and perhaps, raw material and intermediate inputs for the 
growing and shifting productive capacity would have to be imported. Hence 
the alleged finding would be entirely possible and, in fact, indicative 
of a successful beginning for a take off into rapid economic development. 
The ext e.l"nal deficit (Imports - Exports) is, of course, net foreign 
investment.Starting from either an external equilbrium or a deficit, the 
fact that imports are growing faster than exports means that some' imports, 
probably capital goods imports, are being obtained in return for IOU's 
or claims on domestic assets of various kinds. When foreign capital 
is induced into the depreciating country over a period of years on an 
en increasing scale, it would certainly not seem justifiable to record 
this as evidence of harm brought about by the depreciation of the currency. 
Indeed it would seem more appropriate to interpret this as evidence 
of a healthy state of expanding investment opportunities and of capital 
accumulation and growth! 
9This argument was stated most strongly and relied on most heavily 
by Remer [ 89 ] but in other studies as well (Ray [ 86 ]). Actually 
evidence presented elsewhere by Remer, himself, [87,88 suggests that such 
a finding at least in the case of China may indeed have been a statistical 
aberration brough about by (1) an increasing tendency to underinvoice 
exports which were subject to export taxes of increasiqg severity due to 
their emphasis on specific taxes in periods of falling export prices 
(2) the omission of all trade in Chinese transport ships (mainly junks) 
carrying on a reportedly brisk and growing trade with neighboring count­
ries and (3) the lag in the exchange rate used to convert gold currency 
to Chinese silver currency by the customs houses behind current rates 
of exchange. 
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(2) :rt was pointed out that exports of the silver countries to other 
countries had in some instances grown as fast or almost as fast as had 
their exports to gold standard countries. Since all si.lver countries 
were during the depreciation of silver 1mplicit1-y devaluating at 
identical rates with respect to gold standard countries but, therefore, 
not with respect to each other, such an outcome was said to imply that 
the observed increase in exports should be attributed to factors other 
than the depreciation of silver
10 • However, by reference to Figure 2, 
the reader will be able to see that increased exports to other silver 
countries would indeed be a l.ikely consequence of devaluation. In this 
diagram DA and DB represent the domestic demand curves for certain export­
ables in silver countries A and B, respectively, and SAand SB represent 
their supply curves, At the initial exchange rate the foreign (gold 
standard countries,) supply and/or demand curve in terms of domestic 
currency (silver pesos) is given by SRWI and A's consumption is given 
by CAl and B's by CBl' A produces SAl a~d imports (CAl - SAl) from the 
gold countries (SRWl). Bis entirely an importer. However, when the 
two silver countries devaluate by P1P2 w
ith respect to gold countries, 
OP
1 
the foreign supply (demand) curve shifts upward to SRW2 , A's consump
tion 
falls to cA2 and 
B's to cB2 • A's pro
duction increases to sA2 while 
B's increases from zero to sB2 , and
 B will become a likely supplier of 
A's imports (cA2 - sA2 ) as well as an 
exporter to the gold countries 
(the rest of the world) of [ ( sB2 - CB2 )' ~••.cA2 .:. S~;-)]. 
It would be easy to construct a case in which the increase in trade 
between A and B would exceed the increase in trade of A and B with the 
rest of the world. This case would be especially likely to arise if 
SA would shift inward over time as external diseconomies set in or 
10See Ray (86] and the Herschell Committee (51.] 
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technological change lags behind that in other sectors (as its 
effective market for A's suppliers dwindles) and/or if SB would 
shift outward over time as each country tends to move in the direction 
of its comparative advantage. The inducement to trade among the various 
devaluating countries would be further enhanced if DA and DB shift 
outward over time as a result of rising incomes in the devaluating 
countries. 
Since many of the silver countries enjoyed feographical proximity 
to each other {grouped as they were almost exclusively in Asia and in 
Latin America) and since ample evidence will be presented that the 
silver countries were growing more rapidly (and hence their demand 
curves were shifting out over time more rapidly) than were the gold 
countries, it would not be surprising to find trade among silver 
countries growing at least as rapidly as between silver and gold stand­
ard countries. Therefore, rather than being interpreted as an 
indication the weakness of the devaluation effect, a rate of growth 
in exports of silver countries to other silver countries equal to 
that of the exports of silver countries to gold countries should more 
appropriately be interpreted as evidence of the strength and healthiness 
of this effect -- a customs union -- creating effect with the bonus 
of also stimulating extra regional exports, 
(3) Almost all of these studies pointed out individual years of 
extremely depreciated rates and poor export performance and/or vice 
versa. However, when very short periods of time are involved, the 
effects of exchange rate changes could be (and often were) swamped by the 
effects of weather, war, disease and internal insurrection and hence this 
kind of evidence is hardly very convincing. Even when the growth rates 
of different short periods of time are compared, as in Lin [ 67 ], the 
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the time lags involved between investment, and output, and export would 
seem to make the usefulness of this kind of evidence most dubious. 
(4) A charge frequently made against devaluation in the present 
context was that exchange rate fluctuations were both a necessary 
consequence of devaluation and a serious evil. While fluctuations 
in exchange rates may have been a characteristic associated with the 
general depreciation of silver during the period under investigation, 
there is no reason to think that exchange rate fluctuation is a necessary 
consequence of exchange rate devaluation. Furthermore~ despite some 
t.ethodological shortcomings, MacBean [ 68] has presented some results 
which suggest that the case against fluctuations or instability of 
various kinds may not be as strong as it was once thought to be, 
(5) In some of the countries it was alleged that export prices 
were falling more rapidly than import prices and that this implied 
both a terms of trade loss attributable to devaluation and made it 
unlikely that an increase in export supply could be induced without 
resorting to coercion. However, Machlup [ 69 ], Tsiang [ 98 ] and 
others suggest that the terms of trade effect is neither the only nor the 
most important consequence of devaluation and that a terms of trade a 
deterioration may not be independent of other (beneficial) effects of 
devaluation. Furthermore, while the implication may hold for a naive 
two-commodity world, it would certainly not hold for a more realistic 
three-commodity world, in which, in addition to imports ~nd exports, there 
is a home goods sector. It is precisely home goods prices that would be 
expected to fall more rapidly than either export or import prices as a 
result of devaluation. It is therefore quite possible, and in fact 
highly likely, that the rise in export prices re~ative to home goods 
would be sufficient. to induce greater export supplv even· if --.. ,'. ·. ~ 
were falling more rapidly than import prices. 
(6) It has been asserted that several of these silver standard 
countries were able to expand their exports at almost the same rate even 
after they had switched from to silver to gold. Such was evidently the 
case for India from the time of the switch to gold in the mid 1890's to 
World War I. Ray [ 86 ] and Keynes [ -5,9 ] have used such an argument 
to belittle the importance of the depreciation om silver in the 18r4-
1894 period. What these authors fail to realize is that, unlike the 
earlier period, the 1895 - World War I period was one of stable silver 
prices and rising export prices
11 aand hence would have been expected 
to have had much the same effect on the supply of exports as devaluation 
in the previous period. 
When one compares the findings of, the composition of and the 
kinds of witnesses called by several of these commissions (favorable 
and unfavorable to the effect of devaluation on economic growth), it 
becomes easy to suspect the objectivity of some of their findings 
Leavens [ 62] has pointed out the heavY influence exerted by importers 
and underrepresentation of exporters in the Indian commissions which is 
in sharp contrast to the experience in Ceylon (Gunasekera [ 48 ]). 
Ingram [ 53 ] reported the excessive influence and nationalistic 
prejudices of foreign advisors in the case of Thailand. Gunasekera [ 48 ] 
pointed out that the British personnel of the commissions and their 
staffs were biased against depreciating exchange by their own personal 
desires to make sterling remittances from their fixed rupee salaries to 
their families and banks in Great Britain. It might be more than 
a coincidence that all of the "native" minority in the Singapore 
11
~e price of ba~. silver in London was ·28.94 pence per ounce in 1894 
and 28.03 in·1912, according to the Committee for the Study of Silver 
Values and Commodity Prices [23, pp. 3-4]. Lewis' price index of 
Primary exports rose from 73 in 1894-6 to 100 in 1913 [64, pp.117-8]. 
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Chamber of Commerce favored retention of silver (Kemmerer [ 57 , p. 394]) 
and that "native" participation was reduced in the subsequent Straits 
. . 11Settlement s Monet rry Commission Also it would appear that Indians 
were not only totally excluded from the deliberations of the Herschell 
and Fowler committees but also were not even permitted to present 
their views to the members of these committees -- committees which 
pro uce . t. t h 121 o exc ange . t . .d d cone usions nega ive deprecia ion 
On the basis of these various kinds of shortcomings and logical 
non-sequitors in the studies which pur~orted to deny the existence of a 
favorable relationship between exchange devaluation and economic growth, 
a new look at the evidence-focusing more on comparative long term 
trends and growth performance -- would seem Justified. 
IV A COMPARISON OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE1~N GOLD, SILVER ANDPAPER CURRENCY COUNTRIES 
In this and the following section we shall attempt to estimate 
the effect.'.'.of exchange rate devaluation on economic development by 
comparing the export performance (and subsequently other growth indicators) 
of silver standard countries (and to a certain extent other devaluating 
countries l-:hich were on an inconvertible paper currency} with that of 
gold standard countries. Euoh comparisons would, of course, yield 
reliable estimates of the impact of continuous devaluation on economic 
a.evelopment only if·"other factors" did not differ between countries. 
As usual history does not readily provide us with such a nice 
opportunity for a controlled experiment', ~he geography, resource, 
11The source of this statement in Kemmerer [ 57 , p. 394-7] 
12Ibid, p. 13 
13Throughout this paper gold-exchange standard countries and silver­
exchange countries will be treated as identical to gold standard and
silver standard countries. 
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endowments, the social and economic institutions and the level and 
momentum of development inherited from the past, of course, 
from country to c-:,untry. However, the rather large sample of countries 
of each type permits comparisons (at least on a, iimited basis) o:f".:sub­
samples of silver and gold standard countries in which other factors 
are fairly similar. Since, as mentioned in the previous section, it was 
quite comm n for those opposed to exchange depreciation to attribute 
export growth and overall economic developemnt to "other factors", it is 
important that we take note at the outset of some of the more pervasive 
of these other influences. 
First, and perhaps foremost among these other influences was 
The time and cost savingthe openlng up of the Suez Canal in 1869. 
in shipping between the Orient and Europe was considerable, In as much 
as most of the Asian countries were on the silver standard
14 at the 
time of the Suez Canal opening, the tilvcr etend.t.rd countries we~e 
probably more favorably influenced by the Suez Canal. than were the gold 
countries. However, French possessions in India and the Dutch East 
Indies were also on gold and thus provide a more fair basis of compar­
ison with the several silver countries of Asia. In other parts of 
the world, notably in Latin America, there were a number of countries on 
both silver and gold
15 • Furthermore, since the Suez Canal was opened 
14India, Ceylon, Japan, Korea, Indochina, the Phillippin:s, Thailand, 
the Malayan states, Straits Settlements and China were all on silver 
throughout this period. 
15Bolivia, the Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) , Ecuador, Mexico and Peru were on 
silver while Argentina, and Chile were on depreciating paper and Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Uruguay, the British, Dutch and French West 
Indies and Guianas were on gold. 
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as early as 1869 -- an event which could easily be anticipated well 
in advance -- whereas the depreciation of silver did not start on a 
significant scale until 1874 (the beginning date for our investigation)~ 
much of the Suez Canal effect was probably realized prior to the 
period under investigation. 
A second and closely related factor was the development of steam­
boats which, like the Suez Canal opening, resulted in lower shipping 
rates. The effect of the steamboat innovation was undoubtedly felt 
only more gradually and therefore was less likely to have been fully 
realized prior to the beginning of the period under investigation 
(1874-1894). On the other hand, it is much less likely that the fall 
in shipping costs would have favored any one group of countries more 
than another. If anything, one might suspect that the countries most 
distant from their main markets, most notably the gold standard countries 
of Oceania and South Africa, would have benefitted most significantly 
from this development. 
A third factor of considerable importance was the importance of 
the "opening up" and "peace-making11 powers which the colonial powers 
exercised on an increasing scale in many of the colonial areas during 
the period and the not inconsiderable investments made in transport 
facilities and other forms of social overhead capital. This factor 
undoubtedly did much to promote trade in the areas affected. However, 
once again, there is no reason to think that the silver standard colonies 
gained to any greater extent than the gold standard countries on this 
account. There were also many examples of silver and gold countries which 
had already obtained their independence and thus where this and other 
effects (both desirable and undesirable) of colonial status were absent, 
.Another factor which might have biased the results considerably if 
it differed significantly between countries is trade policy. There is 
-19-
some indication that both export and import tax rates fell over the period in 
many countries--at least until the 1890vs--but there is no reason to believe 
that the changes are more noticeable in the devaluating countries than in the 
gold countries. Actually trade liberalization was probably weakest in the 
depreciating paper countries. However, as noted in the introduction, the 
period under investigation was characterized by relatively free trade and 
quantitative restrictions on trade (with the exception of restricting on 
spec e movements in. a f . ) 1 .i ew countries were a most nonexistent. 16 
Still another major "outside:1 influence was the trend in commodity prices. 
Although one cannot be very precise for want of reliable and relevant sta­
tistics, there is evidence of great diversity in price trends even though 
almost all prices were falling over the period. Some prices (such as those 
of copperp rice, various cereals, sugar, and cotton) fell much more rapidly 
than the price of silver, whereas the prices of some commodities (e.g., 
tobacco, animals, meat, dairy products, machinery, coal, wine, lumber and 
of course gold) declined to a considerably smaller degree than the price of 
silver, Although the two decade period under investieation should be suf­
ficiently long to permit countries to depart significantly from their tra­
ditional export bundles, the high degree of product concentration in the 
exports of a large number of countries--both silver and gold--and the long 
gestation period between plantings and output in a number of these products 
make it likely that the varying world market conditions for the country's 
base period export bundle could have accounted for considerably different 
patterns of export performance over the period. Naturally, countries, where 
export prices were falling more rapidly than the average, would be affected 
16see J.B. Condliffe [ 24] • ] •
17Th . i ndexes ref erred he price to are t e who1esa1e pr i ce i ndices f or t he 
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adversely in comparison with countries whose export prices were falling less 
rapidly. Unfortunately, the lack of detailed volume and price statistics 
for exports during the period for all but a few countries makes it impos­
sible to test the importance of relative differences in world market con­
ditions of different commodity bundles in explaining differences in export 
performance in any systematic or comprehensive way. There would seem to 
be every indication that on the whole the export prices of gold standard 
18 
countries did not fall as rapidly as those of silver standard countries. 
Therefore, the omission of such differences in the overall comparison of 
the export performance of silver and gold countries, which is to follow, 
will bias the results against the hypothesis that continuous devaluation is 
conducive to export growth and economic development. 
Finally, it should be admitted that, despite general peace in the 
world between the mid-1870's and the mid-1890's, there were some small wars, 
internal rebellions revolutions, droughts, floods, disease epidemics and 
various other exogenous factors which may have affected individual countries 
considerably but not silver, gold or paper countries as a whole. Therefore 
in what follows, we shall present the evidence we have been able to accumu­
late to date in such a way as to compare the overall experience of the de­
preciating silver standard and paper standard countries with that of gold 
17 (continued) 
U.S. available in U.S. Bureau of the Census [ 104] ] and scattered 
series of export and import price indices of various national sources 
utilized below. 
· 18rhis may or may not be an indication of a terms of trade loss for 
the silver countries attributable to devaluation. Imlah's careful 
study (52] of the British terms of trade during this period found no 
positive influence of currency appreciation for Great Britain. 
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standard countries leaving it to the reader to make his own comparisons of 
individual countries which he feels may be most comparable. If anything, 
this simplification probably biases the results against our hypothesis. 
Thereby we relegate the consideration of various of these Fother factors" to 
the explanation of some of the larger deviations from group norms (i.e., the 
mean growth rates for gold and silver countries) rather than for explaining 
the more fundamental intergroup differences. 
4. Export Performance of the Gold Standard Countries 
In Tables 2 and 3 we present aggregate merchandise exports, as mea­
sured in gold currencies, for each of the colonies of Great Britain and 
France, respectively, that were effectively on the gold standard. (Several 
of the other British colonies--Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, the Malayan 
states, Ceylon and India--were on silver standards. Of the French colonies 
only Indochina remained on silver until the end of the 19th century.) In 
Table 4 appear the corresponding export statistics in the appropriate gold 
currency of other gold standard countries including some of the more highly 
developed economies and the colonies of Holland and Spain. Unfortunately, 
the statistics of the French colonies are not comparable with those of 
Tables 2 and 4 in as much as they cover a somewhat shorter period. On 
an aggregate basis we have interpolated the figures back to 1876 on the 
basis of the colonies exports to France, alone, between 1876 and 1880. If 
the statistics were available on a comparable basis back to the early 
1870's, it is conceivable that a slight growth in the gold value of exports 
would have been revealed instead of the significant decline in their ex­
ports which is shown in Table 3. But it would seem quite unlikely that the 
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Table 2 
Merchandise Exports of the British Colonies 
1 on the Gold Standard in Millions of British~ 
Colony 1871-1875 Average 1894-1896 Average 
Mauritius 2.584 1.579 
Labuan .095 .055 
Falkland Islands .039 .129 
Natal .590 .758 
Cape of Go9d Hope 4.013 7.800 





Gold Coast .317 .698 
Sierra Leone .020 .018 
Gambia .1388 .0812 
Canada 17.211 24.659 
Newfoundland 1.303 1.191 
Bermuda .064 ,098 
British Honduras .222 .176 
Bahamas .919 .1233 
Turk's Island .023 .027 
Jamaica 1,288 1.669 
St. Lucia ,160 .109 
St. Vincent .217 .071 
Barbados .928 .581 
Grenada .153 .181 
Tobago .070 .010 








Trinidad 1.152 1.379 
British Guiana 2.538 1.3215 
Malta9 8,205 5.0006 
Australia 17 .880 30.500 
New Zealand 3.380 (5.315>7 7.844 
Total 64.525 87,168 
Index 1894-6 (1871-5=100) = 135.1 
Does not include Fiji Islands, Gibraltar, British Borneo, Zanzibar, Britis~ 
East Africa, Cyprus, British New Guinea, for which data was not available 
and/or were not under British control in one of the periods. 
2Includes Northwest territories which was not part of Dominion of Canada in 
1871-5 period. 
3rncludes Caico Islands which were not included in earlier figures, 




Table 2 (continued) 
6Includes Northern territories not included in the earlier period. 
7rncludes bullion and specie exports. 
1872-76 average. 
9May include some reexports. 
Sources: (1) For all colonies except Australia: United Kingdom, Board of 
Trade [101]. 
(2) For Australia: N.G. Butlin [14, Table 247, p. 410). 
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Table 3 
Merchandise Exports of the French Colonies on the Gold 
Standard 1876-80 to 1893-95 
(in millions of French francs) 
1880 
1876-1880
Average To Other To Other
French Coun-
Colony to France to France Colonies tries Total 
Martinique 22.4 24.5 .6 8.8 33.9 
Guadaloupe 19.8 20.7 .2 10.0 30.9 
French Guinea .4 .5 .1 .6 
5.1 23.5Reunion 22.6 18.1 .4 
12.9 19.8 3.6 1.9 25.3Senegal 
French India 6.1 11.1 1.2 13.2 25.4 
8.5 7.6 1.8 2.3 11.7St. Pierre et Miquelon 
Madagascar 3.3 3.5 3.0
1 6.51 
.81 3.3Tahiti .8 2.5 
2.4 2.4New Caledonia 
1.44
Gabon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Other French West 
? 5.2Africa ? ? ? 
Total (excluding
French West Africa and 
Indochina) 96.8 106.6 7.8 49.3 




,3column and row totals are not identical because of rounding error and because a 
breakdown of exports by destination is not available for Gabon. 
41881 data 
51aao total has been interpolated back to 1876 on the basis of the French import 
statistics 1876-80. 
Source: France, Hinistere and Colonies [41]. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
1893-5 
To Other To Other 
French Coun-
Colony To France Colonies tries Total 
Martinique 20.1 .5 1.3 21.9 
Gusdaloupe 15.4 .5 .2 16.1 
French Guinea 9.2 .2 9.4 
Reunion 15.8 .2 .9 16.9 
Senegal 12.5 .1 3.7 16.3 
French India 10.8 .3 7.9 19.0 
St. Pierre et IYliquelon 6.3 1.4 2.5 10.2 
t1adagascar 2.0 .2 2.4 4.6 
Tahiti .2 .2 2.7 3.1 
New Caledonia 2.5 4.9 7.4 
Gabon n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.1 
Othe:: French West Africa 5.2 13.0 18.2 
Total (e2::cluding French 
West Africa and 
Indochina) 94.85 3.4 26.7 128.0 






Colu~n nnd row totals are not identical because of rounding error and because 
a breakdown of exports by destination is not available for Gabon. 
41881 date,. 
C: 
J1830 total has been interpolated back to 1876 on the basis of the French import
statistica 1876-80. 
Source: France, Hinistere and Colonies [41]. 
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Table 4 
Exports of Other Gold Standard Countries and Colonies 























Denmark million kroner 154.0 211.0 137.0 
Dutch East 
Indie:b million florins 112.0

















































Kingdom million pounds 243.7 221.7 91.0 
United 






















61892 13Egypt had a bimetallic standard 
71874 until 1885 
14Although nominally on a silver standard 
Venezuela after 1877 prohibited imports of silver currency. repeatedly coined 
new gold coins and according to Ramon Veloz Economia y Finanzas de Venezuela 
Des de 1831 Hasta 1944~ Vol. 41, 
Caracas, Impresos Unidos, 1945 the bolivar remained at a rate of approximately 
25 bolivars to the British pound throughout the period. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Sources: Algeria: [2, 1873-5, p, 279 and 1894-6, pp. 209-211). 
Belgium: Belgium, Statistique de la Belgique [8, 1892, p. IX and 1896, p, V]. 
Bulgaria: Bulgaria [11, p. XIII]. 
Cuba: Friedlaender [43] and Porter [84]. 
Denmark: Henriksen and Olgaard [50, p. 40), 
Dutch East Indies: Furnivall [44, p. 129, 169, 171, 207, 337, 338], 
Egypt: Head [71, Table 6, p. 267]. 
Finland: Frederiksen [42, pp. 153-4). 
France: France, Direction Generale de Douanes [40, 1875, p, XXIV and 1896, p. XXXVII]. 
Germany: United States? National Monetary Commission [106, p. 153]. 
Haiti: Bulletin of the American Republics [12, Vol, 2). 
Italy: Clough [21] and Italy, Ministerio Della Finanze [55, 1879, p. 304]. 
Netherlands: Netherlands [76, 1896, pp. 135-6). 
Norway: Norway [77, 1881, p. 57 and 1894, p. 68). 
Portugal: Harvand [70] • 
Sweden: Institute for Social Sciences, University of Stockholm (96, Vol. III 11 p. 584]. i 
United Kingdom: Imlah [52, p. 97). 
United States: U.S. Bureau of the Census [104]. 
Uruguay: Uruguay [108] and Acevedo [1, pp. 38-43 and 85-104]. 
Venezuela: Venezuela [110, Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 34-5]. 
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export value of the French colonies could have grown as rapidly as the other 
countries. 
The average gold standard country--rich or poor, British or French, Dutch 
or Spanish, Asian, African, etc.--would seem to have achieved a growth in the 
value of exports of,
'-
only about 30 percent in more than twenty years--an an-
nual rate of growth of barely 1 percent per annum. It must be remembered 
that, with world prices falling steadily at about 2 percent per year over the 
period, in real terms the increase in exports would be somewhat higher. Never­
theless, it should be quite clear that the picture was hardly a very exciting 
one. The value of exports in no fewer than 28 different gold standard coun­
tries or colonies actually declined during this period of more than twenty 
years! While it is tru.2. that exports grew moderately rapidly in some of the 
larger and more important colonies such as the Cape of Good Hope, Algeria, 
Australia, New Zeal.end~ the Netherlantfs and some of the newer colonial terri­
tories of Natal, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Gabon, Guinea, and New Caledonia, 
in almost all of these cases the growth of exports could be largely attributed 
to certain very unusual .::dvantages. The nopening-up 11 effect was probably 
of utTiost i~portance in the yery early stages of colonization in New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Australia, all of the other African colonies and New Caledonia. 
Expecially favorable export price mcvements undoubtedly also played a role, 
e.g., in the c,s.se of New Zealand (gold, dairy products, meat) the Nether­
lands (dairy produ~ts), South Africa and Natal (meat, gold, coal) and 
Uruguay (meat and sheepskins). The technological innovation of refrigera­
tion and refrigerated cargo sh:tps in the 1880's probably contributed greatly 
to the growth of dairy and meat exports from Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, 
Sou.th Africa, the Scandin;:J.vian countries and the Netherlands. As mentioned 
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above, the speed and cost improvements in shipping would also have favored 
the countries most distant from their principal markets in Western Europe-­
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the sub-Saharan African colonies 
and New Caledonia. Furthermore, the more rapidly growing countries also had 
rapidly growing populations so that in per capita terms exports were falling 
19 N d 20 A 21 Cn ew Z 1· ana a d pro a of 
African colonies. 
i Uruguay, ea1an, ustra 1a, d an bbly most t1el 
B. Export Performance of Silver and Paper Countries 
Statistics on aggregate exports are unfortunately much scarcer for 
silver and paper countries and there are a number of such countries for which 
it has been impossible to find any export data. In Tables 5 and 6 we pre­
sent what statistics we have been able to find for silver and paper coun­
tries, respectively. In order to be as comparable as possible with the 
data presented for the gold standard countries, all statistics have been 
presented in terms of a gold currency or in a silver currency deflated by 
the price index of silver in terms of gold from Table 1. As the notes and 
sources indicate, the statistics have been obtained from widely scattered 
sources and, therefore, it would seem only fair to warn the reader that the 
figures p~esented in these tables are undoubtedly less reliable than those 
presented in the previous tables. In addition, the years for which we were 
19See Hanson [49]. 
20 see Simkin [94a] and Condliffe [25]. 
Indeed Condliffe presents a series of per capita exports in constant prices 
which drop more than 50 percent between 1871 and 1895! 
21 see N.G. Butlin 
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Table 5 





























































Units 1872-5 Average 
tons of tin exports 
million British pounds 
million HK tael deflated by 
exchange rate index 
million dollars (US) 
million dollars (US) 
million dollars (US) 
million rupees deflated by 
exchange rate index 
1892-3 
million yen deflated by 
exchange rate index 
million yen deflated by 
exchange rate index 
million silver dollars 
deflated by exchange 
rate index 
million silver dollars 
deflated by exchange 
rate index 
million dollars (US) 
million sols deflated by 
exch'lnge rate index 
million dollars (US) con­
verted by exchange rate 
of Mexican pesos to 
dollars 
million dollars (US) 
million silver dollars 
deflated by exchange 
rate index 
million bhat deflated by 
exchange rate index 
million francs 

















Table 5 (continued) 
Notes: 
1Virtually no export data is available for Bolivia for this period due to the 
fact that its exports move by land through Argentina, Chile, Peru and Para­
guay to shipping ports. However, all references that could be uncovered in­
dicated this was a boom period for Bolivia despite territorial losses and 
financial stress resulting from the war with Chile 1880-1. 
21880 
31890 
4For 1895 only. China's exports during the year were hampered by war and the 
loss of Formosa. 
51883 
61893-5 average. 
71883 figure in silver pesos converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of exchange 
rate for that year. 
81896-9 average. 
91871-4 average. 
lOTin exports only. 
111871 converted on the basis of exchange rate of that year. 
12According to Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Modern Currency Reforms, N.Y. MacMillan 
Co., 1916 after 1877-80 imports of foreign silver currency were prohibited in 
an effort to maintain the silver price and hence the exchange rate of domestic 
currency (pesos) in terms of gold currencies in the face of the falling world, 
price of silver. The extent to which the authorities were successful in this 
respect is not clear as information on local or "black market'' exchange rates 
for that period are not available. Benito Legarda, Jr., makes no mention of 
exchange restrictions in "Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nine­
teenth-Century Philippines," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1955, 
To the extent that the exchange rate (in pesos per dollar) was kept below the 
N.Y. rates of silver pesos per dollar, the dollar figure for 1892-5 under­
at the same time would account for theestimates the true dollar figure and 




151895 converted on basis of exchange rate of that year. 
16Foreign trade only. 
17Korea and Bolivia have been excluded. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Sources: 
Bolivia: Bulletin of the American Republics [12, Vol. 4, pp. 612]. 
Ceylon: United Kingdom, Board of Trade, [101, Part XV, 1871-5, p. 45 and 
Part XXII, 1894-6, p. 69]. 
China: Cheng [18, p. 258] and China (19, 1883 and 1896]. 
Costa Rica: Guell [47], and Bulletin of the American Republics[l2, Vol. 3, p. 692). 
Ecuador: Carbo [16, especially p. 447]. 
Guatemala: Alan Cohen [22], Young [115] and Bulletin of American Republic (12, 
Vol. 4, p. 1011]. 
India: Ray [86]. 
Japan: Baba and Tatemoto (5, Table 6-2, p. 167]. 
Korea: Paul W. Kuznets[60, Table 1, p. 24]. 
Malaya: Van Ooms (unpublished statistics prepared for a study of the Malayan 
economy). 
l':iexico: Mexico [72, p. 75 and p. 153]. 
Nicaragua: Levy [63] and Bureau of the American Republics, [13, Bulletin No. 6, 
May 1891, p. 103]. 
Peru: Peru [81, 82], Dunn [32], and Peru (83, p. 32]. 
Philippines: United States, Bureau of the Census (103, Vol, IV, pp. 564-5]. 
El Salvador: Bureau of the American Republics (13, p. 116], and El Salvador, 
Direccion General de Estadistica [35]. 
Straits Settlements: Van 0oms (unpublished statistics prepared for a study 
of the Malayan economy). 
Thailand~ Ingram [53, pp. 240-241]. 
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Table 6 
Exports of Countries with Inconvertible Paper Currencies 
1892-6 
Country 1870-5 1892-6 Index 
Average Average (1870-5=100) 
Argentina 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 42.5 106.7 251.1 
Austria-Hungary 
(millions of golden 
[stable gold]) 9704.6 775.0 110.0 
Brazil (millions of b) 








Colombia (millions of U.S. 
dollars) 9.7
3 255.7 
Greece (million francs) 37.7
7 258.4 
Paraguay (millions of U.S. 
dollars) 1.811 2.912 
Russia (millions of rubles, 
gold) 
5339.2 134.5 
Spain (milU.ons of pesetas 
[gold]) 490.0 666.9 136.1 
Average of the Individual Indices for the Above Countries 184.4 
11874 on1y. 61891-1894.
21894 only. 71869-70.
31871-3 only. 81890 converted from drachmas to franc§
41891 only. on basis of average exchange rate 
51871-5 only. 
91883-5 average. 
10colombia was on the gold standard until 1886. 
111881-3 average. 
121890-1 only 
Sources: Argentina: National Association of Manufactures [75]. 
Austria-Hungary: Austria-Hungary [4, 1886, p. 171 and 1896, p. 207]. 
Brazil: Brazil [10]. 
Chile: Fetter [38]. 
Colombia: Garcia [45]. 
Greece: Tumlir [99, p. 197]. 
Paraguay: De Bourgade la Dardye [28] and Schurz (92). 
Russia: Willis [114]. 
Spain: Vives [112]. 
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able to obtain data does not correspond in many of the cases to those of the 
previous tables, However, in general the time spen covered by Tables 5 and 
6 is shorter than that of the previous tables and hence is likely to under­
state the trueexport growth of silver and paper standard countries over 
the two decade period between the early 1870 9 s and middle 1890's. 
Despite these and other shortcomings of the statistics, the figures 
should be sufficient to demonstrate that the export performance of both the 
paper and especially the silver standard countries was radically different 
from that of the gold standard countries, As the average indexes presented 
in Tables 5 and 6 indicate, th9 average silver standard country's exports 
increased 144.8 percent and the average country on inconvertible paper cur­
rency (most of which were devaluating with respect to gold) increased its 
22exports by 84.4 percent. Thus, exports in the average silver country in-
creased by more than 4 percent per annum or more than four times the growth 
of exports in gold standard countries! In contrast to the 28 gold standard 
countries or colonies whose exports fell in value terms, there is~ evi­
dence that any silver or paper country experienced a decline in the (gold) 
23value of its exports. 
22 
It has not been possible to weight the individual countries in the 
aggregate index by the size of exports (or any other appropriate weighting 
factor) due to lack of consistent and reliable information of exchange rates 
between the different silver and gold currencies. If weights had been 
applied it is quite conceivable that the weighted average index would show a 
somewhat smaller rate of growth in exports since some of the big countries 
(India, China and the Philippines) had the slowest growth rates of the coun­
tries in this group, However, since other large exporters (Japan and Mexico) 
were among the best performers, since Korea, the best performer, was not 
included and because as explained in footnote 12 of Table 5 exports of the 
Philippines for the 1890 1 s are undoubtedly understated, the exaggeration of 
the overall rate of growth of exports of silver countries is probably not great.
23If earlier sta.tistics had been used for Peru, they would have shown a 
decline but only because Peru lost territory in its war with Chile which pro­
duced the bulk of its eY.ports prior to 1880. 
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The variation in export growth even among silver countries is of course 
quite substantial. However, most of the more significant differences can be 
roughly accounted for by the other factors mentioned above. For example, 
the extremely rapid growth reported for Korea must certainly be largely at­
tributable to the nopening upi; forced upon Korea in 1876 by Japan which 
radically changed this country that had formerly been characterized as 
nhermit kingdom. n The law and order effect of British influence undoubtedly 
had much to do with Malaya's performance. Hexico's impressive performance 
was probably assisted by the abolition of the "alcabala,"or transit tax im­
posed by individual states a.ud municipalities on trade between regions and 
towns within Mexico (Limantour [66]). 
On the other hand, the seemingly poor performance of the Philippine 
Islands can be explained as follows: first, as explained in footnote 12 of 
Table 5, the authorities evidently tampered with the exchange rate after 
1880 in a deliberate effort to prevent the implicit devaluation, and thus 
the Philippines should perhaps not be classified as a silver country in the 
same sense. Second, to the extent the authorities succeeded in this effort, 
the dollar figures for exports of the 1890's,which have been arrived at by 
conversion of original pesos to c~ollars, at the New York 
rate quoted for conversion of Nexican peso to dollar undoubtedly seriously 
understate the true dollar value of Philippine exports for that period. 
Third, a somewhat below average pe~formance would be expected on the basis 
of the fact that the prices of two of its major export commodities (sugar 
and abaca) fell considerably more rapidly than world prices in general. 
1'1oreover, according to Stephe!l Resnick's unpublished worksheets, Philippine 
exports grew in real terms between 1875 and 1893 at a rate of more than 
-35-
4.5 percent per annum regardless of whether 1857 or 1893 weights are used. 
This record would establish this period as the second or third greatest boom 
period in recorded Philippine history! 
While India ohowed only e.n 8 percent increase in value terms, it is 
quite clear that expo~ts were booming in real terms. Using the 11 largest 
24export products for which volume and value data are provided in Ray 
to compute an aggregate volume index, we have found the rate of growth of 
these Indian exports in real terms to be more than 15 percent per annum over 
the period 1873-4 to 1891-2. India registered a remarkable 18-fold increase 
in wheat exports over the period, It is no wonder then that U.S. farmers 
were prompted to complain of unfair competition from India, as ironic as it 
would seem today. 
The comparatively slow growth in Ceylon would seem to be understandable 
in view of the fact that Ceylon had to completely rebuild its export indus­
try after its principle export crop was wiped out by the coffee leaf dis­
ease in the 1870' s and conside,~ing that the first two attempts to replace 
25
coffee failed for technical reasons. 
Similarly, the compara~ively poor Chinese p~rformance can probably be 
attributed to (1) the virtually complete absence of transport facilities 
connecting the few 11 open ports" on the coasts with the interior, (2) the high 
and rising ijlikin" or transit tax rate--rising because it was largely a spe­
cific tax and prices were falling--(3) internal chaos and banditing, and 
(4) the absence of adequate financial institutions. Finally, it is perhaps 
24The products included were cotton, opium, seeds, rice, wheat, cotton 
manufactures, jute, tea, iDdico, hides and skins, wool, and coffee, 
25 see Snodgrass [95]. 
26See Cheng [ 18] . 
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27appropriate to repeat the point m.'3.de earlier that since the trade in Chinese 
junks was not included in the Chinese trade statistics and because unrealistic 
exchange rates were used in export evaluation, the growth of Chinese exports 
during this period is undoubtedly understated, Furthermore, China lost the 
important export producing island of Formosa and also the Pescadores Islands 
to Japan in 1895, and hence Chinese exports of the middle 1890's are not exactly 
comparable with those of the mid-1870's. 
Even though most of the paper countries devaluated their currencies sub­
stantially with respect to gold, they do not offer the same advantages in 
terms of the automaticity of devaluation. In many cases the inconvertibility 
of their currencies was pro~pted by difficulties in financing wars or in 
servicing their foreign debt end for one reason or another many of these 
countries suffered from instabilitytinflation and other problems to a greater 
degree than did the silver and gold countries. For these reasons very little 
attentfon will be paid to the,o. However, it might be pointed out that in 
general the slowest export growth was attained in the countries wich moved 
toward the gold standard at the end of the period as in Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, and thz most rapid growth was attained in countries such as Colombia, 
Brazil and Greece whicl1 noved fu::ther away from parity with gold--thereby 
providing sor.1e limited additional support for the iBporta.nce of exchange 
rate policy 0:1 the grm·1th of exports. 
Finally, in order to be as con.plcte as possible and thereby to reduce 
the possibility that countries· which we ha•,e not been able to include in 
tables 2-6 for lack of dato, would have displayed export performances at 
27See footnote 9 ~hove. 
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variance with those of the other gold and silver countries covered in these 
tables, we present in Table 7 comparable data on imports of the United 
States from each of the other countries of North and South America,and in 
Table 8 the imports of Great Britain and France from some countries for 
which data was either not presented in the earlier tables or was not con­
sidered very reliable. 
Since these statistics refer, of course, only to a portion of a par­
ticular country's exports, they are certainly not as reliable indicators of 
performance as the data in the previous tables. Nevertheless, they offer 
some indication of some additional evidence. For example, Table 7 shows 
that Santa Domingo, the lone Caribbean country on silver, increased its 
average annual exports to the U.S. in 1893-5 to more than five times its 
1870-4 average while each of the other gold standard countries in the re­
gion (Cuba, the Danish,French and Dutch West Indies, Puerto Rico, and to 
a lesser extent Haiti) displayed extremely poor export performance. Table 
8 offers some indication that the export industries of the Portuguese and 
Spanish colonies (all effectively on a par with gold) may also have ex­
perienced extremely bad times. 
The results presented in these tables would seem to be quite consis­
tent with our previous estimate that the merchandise exports (in value 
terms) of gold standard countries may have been growing at about 1 percent 
per annum while those of silver standard countries were probably growing at 
better than 4 percent per annum, give or take a percent. While it has not 
been generally possible to estimate the growth in volume of exports, where 
we have been able to obtain such estimates, the rate would seem to be at 
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Table 7 
U.S. Imports from the American Countries and Colonies 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Silver Countries 1870-1874 Average 1893-1895 Average 







Mexiio 8.0 22.1 
Peru 1.6 .7 
Santa Domingo .4 2.3 
Total 12.7 41.0 
Gold Countries 
British Guiana and West Indies 8.4 11.4 
Canada 42.1 33.9 
Cuba 72.6 64.5 
Danish West Indies .6 .4 
Dutch West Indies 1.1 .1 
French West Indies 1.7 .o 
Haiti 1.4 1.8 
Puerto Rico 9.7 2.3 
Uruguay 2.9 2.0 
Venezuela 4.0 6.8 








Colombia 5.9 3.0 
Total 44.9 94.8 
Notes: 
1chile was on inconvertible paper throughout part of this period. 
2Ecuador was on paper prior to stabilization and devaluation in 1884. 
31893 only. 
4Chile obtained a considerable amount of land from which minerals were exported 
from Bolivia and Peru as a result of war won by Chile 1880-1881. 
5colombia was on gold standard until 1886 and thereafter on inconvertible paper. 
6Brazilian exchange rate remained constant with respect to gold currencies until 
a series of devaluations beginning in 1890-1891. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Sources: 1870-2: Bureau of the American Republics (13, pp. 32-4). 
1872-3: U.S. House of Representatives (105, Third Session, 42nd 
Congress, p. 79]. 
1873-4: U.S. House of Representatives (105, First Session, 43rd 
Congress, p. 101]. 
1893-4: U.S. House of Representatives [105, Third Session, 53rd 
Congress, Vol. 26, No. 6, P, LVII]. 
1894-5: U.S. House of Representatives [105, First Session, 54th 
Congress, Vol. 30, N. 13, Part 1, p. XX.XII]. 
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Table 8 
French and British Imports from Gold and Silver Countries and 
Colonies for which Data is Completely or Totally 
Missing in Other Tables 
British Imports in French Imports in 
millions of British l:i millions of francs 
1872-4 1892-4 1870-5 1894-6 
Gold Standard Countries Average Average Average Average 
Algeria 438 596 108 185 
Azores 317 65 
Canary Islands 419 285 
Cuba and Puerto Rico 4788 155 30 15 
Dutch Guiana 




17 1 1 
Fernando Po 32 5 
Haiti 358 63 35 71 
Italy 3862 3105 440 215 
Macao 1106 6 
Madeira 74 62 
Morocco 785 555 
Portuguese Africa 127 72 
Switzerland 320 335 
Tunis and Tripoli 177 346 
Turkey 5784 5142 182 133 
Uruguay 1375 229 39 29 
Total of Above Countries 18,861 10,729 1155 984 
Silver Standard Countries 
Bolivia .02 .22 
Ecuador 286 187 1.9 9.9 
Guatemala 1000 1100 1.7 6.5 
Indochina 19 89 .6 19.7 
Japan 400 980 57.2 74.8 
Mexico 497 531 7.5 13.2 
Philippines 1405 1981 1.6 --2.!i 
Total of Above Countries 3607 4868 70.5 129.7 
Sources: Great Britain: United Kingdom, Board of Trade 
France: France, Direction Generale des Douanes 
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least three or four times the rate of increase in value of exports--generally 
a higher multiple in silver standard countries (due to.more rapidly falling 
export prices) than in the gold standard countries. Even the apparently 
slowest growing silver standard countries were in real terms undergoing a 
more or less continuous export boom of considerable magnitude. 
v. Other Growth Indicators Compared 
According to the findings of the previous section there would seem to be 
much support for the existence of a positive effect of continuous devalua-
tion on long-run export performance. It remains to be seen, though, to what 
extent and in what direction export growth resulting at least partially from 
devaluation has affected economic welfare and development in a broader sense. 
Unfortunately, statistical limitations make it impossible to obtain more 
fundamental indicators of development, such as per capita income, for area­
sonably large sample of countries. We shall proceed by surveying individual 
gold standard and subsequently silver standard countries utilizing national 
income statistics wherever possible and supplementing them with relevant 
descriptive material. In order to focus more narrowly on the development 
process, from now on we shall confine our attention almost exclusively to 
countries in the beginning stages of economic development. 
A. The Gold Standard Countries: 
DUTCH EAST INDIES 
Perhaps the most interesting experience among the various countries on 
the gold standard was that of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch East 
Indies provides an interesting example not only because it was the only major 
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gold standard country in Asia in the period under investigation, but also be­
cause the period 1870-1894 was a unique period in the long and varied ex­
perience of Dutch rule in which liberalism (at least by Dutch colonial stan-
28
dards) prevailed. Among the reforms undertaken in this period were (1) the 
granting of rights of private ownership (especially of land) to natives, 
(2) importation of Chinese to assist development, (3) a dramatic step-up in 
development expenditures of the government (mainly on roads with the specific 
purpose of speeding transportation of commodities for export, but also on 
irrigation, education, harbors, experimental stations, forestry services, and 
internal communications), and (4) a cut in export tax rates. 
What was the outcoma of these impressive development-oriented reforms 
and programs in a period of falling export prices and exchange appreciation 
relative to neighboring silver countries? Hard data is unfortunately lacking 
but a few impressions may be sufficient. For one thing there were a series 
of bank and business failures ending in mergers and monopolization. Furnivall 
notes that neither imports nor production ~f cotton goods and rice (the most 
important wage goods) were able to keep up with population growth between 
1875 and 1900, indicating a decline in the welfare of the masses. 
11 The native not only drc1·1 lower wages, but he had less work, as the 
economies consequent on the crisis, such as the substitution of imported 
fertilizers for stable m~nure, of imported gunny-bags for home-woven baskets 
and of light railways for carting, left the people with fewer opportunities 
to earn money 11 (Furnivall [44, p. 214]. (Note how indicative these 
phenomena are of an increasingly overvalued currency!) One consequence of 
the refo:r.ms was that, in contrast to previous periods in which administration 
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of the Dutch East Indies generated a sizeable revenue surplus for use in 
Holland, the Dutch East Indies became for the first time a deficit opera­
tion. As a result of increased costs of administration with so little to 
show for it in terms of development (e.g., Table 4 showed that the increase 
in the value of exports was less than 30 percent in 20 years). It is no 
wonder that after 1895 the Dutch reverted back to interventionism and pa­
ternalism rationalized by the Dntch economist-administrator J. H:. Boeke in 
his well-known theory of social dualism: 
"When the native, the tani, enjoyed the growing of a crop no care 
or labor was too much for him. But he could find real pleasure 
only when the product satisfied one of his ovm needs, and these 
needs were few, unexactir:.s and of little variety. As a rule, 
the tani did not, of his own accord, produce for the Western mar­
kct--or, in.deed, for any market, if in an exceptional case he did 
so, it had to be w:!.th the slightest possible expenditure of labor 
and other costs, therefore, through some form of quite extensive 
cultivation. In other words, the exertion uas worth his while 
only if he could gather the harvest without having been obliged 
to pay much attention to the growing of the crop." Boeke [9, p. 2]. 
One wonders how much Boeke 9 s views,and for that matter the modern his-
tory of the Dutch East Indies mtght have been altered if this rather unique 
period of liberalism had been bo~n into an environ:nent in which the economic 
incentives for increased production and export, such as might have been pro­
vided by a depreciating cu;:·;:ency, would have existed! 
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EGYPT 
The experience of Egypt was in many ways similar. Egypt was on a bi­
metallic standard and effectively on silver until 1885 and only thereafter 
switched to gold. Although the Egyptian case is complicated by national 
bankruptcy and an austerity program imposed by foreign creditors, despite 
enormous capital expenditures on dams, transportation, etc., Egypt stagnated. 
Once again per capita consumer goods imports declined sharply--indicating a 
decline in the per capita income of the masses. Head [71] notes"~:- a rise 
in unemployment and underemployment in the 1890's and attributes it entirely 
to the fact that the Delta Barrage Dam of 1890 reduced labor requirements by 
raising the water level in the irrigation canals, In view of the findings 
of our comparisons of silver and gold standard countries and the theoreti-
cal expectations outlined in Section II, we might suggest with some confidence 
that the exchange rates may have had something to do with it by favoring im­
ports to domestic import substitutes or exports and lowering the prices of 
imported capital goods relative to labor. 
NEW ZEALAND 
About New Zealand after 1880 we learn the following: 
"There followed the gloomiest period of the country's history: all 
but absolutely necessary expenditure was checked, development was 
suspended, public soup-kitchens were found necessary, civil ser­
vants had their salaries retrenched 10 percent all round. 
Scho'lefield in "The Evolution of New Zealand" talks of unemploy­
ment, sweating, lowered wages, and general stagnation of industry ••• 
A Sweating Commission found evidence of unhealthy crowding, and 
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of overwork of women and girls, •••••• Not only were money wages 
falling faster than prices but unemployment was scarce and in­
secure.11 (Condliffe [25, p. 955]). 
Condliffe goes on to show that even the marrtage rate (standardized for 
population growth) showed a drop of more than 20 percent between 1871-5 and 
1891-5 [25, p. 951-2]. Thus is would seem that even New Zealand, which ac-
cording to Table 2 was perhaps the star export performer among the gold 
standard countries, shared with the other less developed gold standard coun­
tries stagnation, unemployment and probably some decline in per capita income. 
OTHER GOLD STANDARD COUNTRIES 
In Australia population exactly doubled between 1874 and 1897 from 
750,000 to 1,500,000, while according to Butlin [14, Table 269, p. 460] real 
GDP (in 1910-11 prices)--which had doubled between 1861 and 1873--rose only 
from ~95.9 million to ~173.8 million in 1897. Hence per capita income de­
clined in Australia as well. 
In Jamaica, according to Eisner [34, p. 289], per capita income 
showed no growth between !870 and 1890 despite relatively favorable prices 
for most of its main exports (especially wood, ginger, bananas, and cocoa), 
and unusually cheap land. 
Clough [21, p. 369] reports a figure for Italian per capita 
income in 1938 prices of 1895 lire in 1871-5 and one for 1891-5 of 1888 lire 
again indicating a slight loss in real per capita income. 
Because of its lesser dependence on international trade and no doubt 
an enormously beneficial opening-·up from the railroad boom, the United States 
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was evidently able to record a fairly satisfactory increase in real per capita 
29GNP, but this record seems to have been unusual even for the more highly 
developed countries on the gold standard. 30 As it would appear from the 
evidence cited above for several of the less developed gold standard countries, 
the poor performance of exports would seem to have carried over to per capita 
income as well. Thus, it seems unlikely that per capita income increased at 
all in these countries during the entire two decade period, and in several 
such countries real per capita income probably fell. 
B. Devaluating Countries on Silver and Paper Standards 
MEXICO 
Although "hard data" are hard to come by for Uexico, the following 
description of the period should show that the Mexican experience of 1870-
1900 was very different from that which has been observed for the less de­
veloped gold standard countries during the same period of time. 
0 In the 30 years preceding the Revolution of 1910, it seemed that Mexico 
was on the path of sustained growth in per capita production as the result 
of domestic peace and of the absorption of the Mexican economy into the 
world economy. An inflow of foreign capital was making possible the con­
struction of railroads, the extension of mining, and an increase of foreign 
and domestic trade. 11 (Edminster [33, p. 332] • 
29According to statistics published in United States, Bureau of the Census 
[104, p. 7 and p. 144), per capita GNP in the U.S. at 1929 prices rose at well 
over 1 percent per annum. 
30Even in industry, an index of industrial production for the major gold 
standard countries shows that industrial production did not much more than 
double in the period, thus indicating rather slow growth in per capita terms. 
[111, p. 69). 
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What statistics there are of the industrial sector show that in the 20 
year period between 1878 and 1898 textile production tripled and mining--
31
metallurgy more than quadrupled its real output. 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
While Argentina and Brazil were on inconvertible paper and therefore not 
exactly comparable with the silver countries it is interesting to note the 
amazing degree of development achieved within the brief periods in which de­
valuation was most pronounced--the 1880 9 s in Argentina and the 1890's in 
Brazil. 
"The decade from 1880 to 1890 is the great 'boom' period of Argentine 
economic history. It is not too much to say that in those 10 years Argentina 
underwent a greater economic development than in all the preceding decades of 
the century." (Williams [113, p. 27). (Subsequent to 1891, especially in 
1894, Argentina's paper currency appreciated and panic, and bankruptcy even 
of the national and provincial governments resulted. (Hilliams [37). 
Meanwhile in Brazil, according to_ Baer [6, p. 15) the number of 
industrial establishments almost doubled in the six years between 1889 and 
1895 in which several large devaluations took place. Most significant was 
the development of the jute manufactures industry in Sao Paulo catering to 
the large and thriving coffee export industry. 
RUSSIA 
All the available evidence seems to suggest that Russia enjoyed very 
31This data is available in Mexico [72, p. 106) • 
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significant growth during this period before going on the gold standard her-
self at the end of the 19th century •... For example, Goldsmith_ [46,. p. -446. and-- pp. 462-·3} 
·shows· that crop production almost doubled between 1871. and 1894, while in-
dustrial production tripled. 
CEYLON 
Despite the unusual technical difficulties experienced by Ceylon, it is 
quite clear that her most satisfactory development extended beyond the con­
fines of agriculture. . Employment. data provided by Snodgrass [ 9 5, p. 322] 
shows that employment in manufacturing and mining more than doubled between 
1881 and 1901. 
Gunasekera points out that Ceylon, like several of the other silver · 
countries, experienced an investment b-oom based largely on foreign capital. 
11 Ceylon, in fact, was experiencing during this period a vast investment 
boom•. Contrary to the generally held view, the depreciation of the exchanges 
was no hindrance to the investment of British capital. In the island the 
Swetthenham Commissioners remarked: 'The evidence we have is conclusive that 
_the fall (in the exchange) has not prevented the introduction of all neces-. 
sary English capital and it is stated that there is more capital offering for 
investment on t·easonable tf\rms than has been the case before- 1 • 11 
Even on the much discussed difficulty that the debtor colonial govern­
ments were alleged to have had in paying fixed obligations in gold while. cur­
rency devaluation was taking place~ the Ceylonese experience, as viewed-by 
the Swettenham Commission, seems most convincing. 
·"The greatly increased number of rupees required to meet these obligation~ 
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is beyond question a very serious matter, but so far the satisfactory increase 
in revenue has enabled the finance of the colony to bear the enhanced claims 
without embarrassment. The Commission is of the opinion that the prosperity 
of the producing interest is the main cause of the satisfactory condition of 
all items of colonial revenue, and that if prosperity were materially checked 
by a change in currency which also effected a saving to government in its 
gold obligations, the direct saving might not be a sufficient compensation for 
the probable shrinkage in revenue.ii (As quoted by Gunasekera [48, p. 114]. 
INDIA 
According to estimates of Mukerji [74, p. 701), India's per 
capita income in 1948-9 prices increased from 177 in 1871-79 to 203 in 1886-
99. If this is correct, it would represent the largest two-decade increase 
in real per capita income in Indian history with the single exception of the 
World Hart boom and the 7 or 8 years thereafter when India's (gold) currency 
depreciated sharply with respect to silver! Again it would seem that a 
significant amount of industrialization was also achieved. Varshney [109] 
shows that between 1879 and 1892 the share of manufactured goods in total 
imports declined from 65 percent to 57 percent while the share of manufac­
tures in exports rose from 8 percent to 16 percent. 
CHINA 
In Section IV, above, we reviewed a number of the more overriding ob­
stacles to economic development in China between 1875 and 1895. It might be 
appropriate to mention another--the series of natural disasters which ravaged 
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China in the late 1880's and early 1890 1s. According to Remer (88] 
the Yellow River flood of 1888 killed two million people; the drought of 1893-4 
killed another one million and the Mohammedan Rebellion immediately there­
after another one-fourth million. 
For these reasons and for lack of statistical material it might be rea­
sonable to attribute the somewhat 1acklustre performance of the Chinese eco­
nomy in this period to special factors and to seek evidence on China for 
another period to determine whether something in the Chinese environment 
would again make for an outcome less successful than that experienced by the 
other devaluating countries. China was virtually alone in remaining on the 
silver standard continuously until 1935. There is therefore another period-­
albeit a much shorter period--between 1925 and 1931 in which the price of 
32
silver was falling with respect to gold at a fairly rapid rate. This was, 
of course, not a very prosperous period especially after 1929 elsewhere in 
the world. For example, in the U.S., real per capita GNP fell sharply and 
exports in value terms dropped off disastrously from $4.9 billion in 1925 
to $2.4 billion in 1931 and $1.6 billion in 1932 reflecting sharp drops in 
both export prices and export volume. Export volume alone dropped by more 
than 35 percent during this brief period. 33 
Meanwhile, China was not only able to maintain the volume of exports 
but to increase it slightly from 132.9 to 136.5 (in index numbers provided 
by Cheng (18, p. 259]. Apparently, China's avoidance of the Great 
32The price index of silver in U.S. dollars fell from .694 in 1925 to 
.290 in 1931 (Cheng (18, p. 263]. 
33These figures are based on those published in United States, Bureau 
of Census [104, p. 537 and 541]. 
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Depression--at least until the appreciation of silver (1932-5) which prompted 
China to depart from the silver standard in 1935--was a unique one. China's 
export performance was not the only astonishing achievement. The number of 
factories with more than 30 factories more than doubledbetween 1925 and 1933, 
34 
the index of industrial production prepared by Chang (17, p. 66] showed an 
increase of 35 percent in these same six years in which the world index at 
industrial production used by Lewis (64, p. 107] showed a decline of 7 
percent. China was transformed from a net importer of cotton yarn to a sub­
stantial exporter. This progress is even more remarkable if one considers 
the fact that many of the same obstacles to development we have noted in the 
previous period persisted. The 11 likin11 ta:::es were not eliminated until late 
1931. There were still no uniform weights and measures, no corporation laws 
for Chinese firms, and no patents; illiteracy was almost universal. As Cheng 
describes it: 
"China was, for most of the period, in a state of instability, chaos, 
and anarchy, torn by internal dissensions and partitioned geographically 
by regional war lords •••• Economic barriers such as 'likin 1 and other local 
tolls and taxes, were too numerous to enumerate. Trains were often derailed 
and destroyed, rolling stocks seized, vessels commandeered by the warring 
parties to disrupt commerce and industry" (18, p. 37]. 
JAPAN 
Perhaps the star performer aoong the major silver countries in the period 
under investigation was Japan. Patrick's deflated version of Ohkawa's 
34Cheng (18] gives the number of such factories in 1926 as 1457 and in 
1953 as 3450. 
-52-
national income statistics [80, p. 201] shows that Japan's real national 
income virtually toppled between 1878 and 1898. To avoid the possibility of 
distortions due to weather,KuzuEts utilizes 5 year averages [61, p. 269]which 
show that even real per capita GDP was growing at 3 percent per annum. In 
providing incentives in terms of higher producer prices and increased export 
opportunities, the falling exchange rate may help explain the rather phe­
nomenal rate of increase in total agricultural productivity of almost 2 per-
cent per annum (Hayami and Yamada [49a, p. 157] Rosovsky [50, p. 321] 
provides data in domestically produced capital goods which shows an almost 
thirty-fold increase in real terms between 1873 and 1897 so that by the turn 
of the century the capital goods sector accounted for more than 5 percent of 
industrial output. In view of the effect of exchange rate devaluation on 
the price of imported capital goods, and in view of the rapidly expanding 
investment opportunities in many export sectors, the formation of a domestic 
capital goods industry should not seem surprising. This rapidly developing 
capital goods industry may have contributed more than its share of GNP by 
helping to provide Japan with a technology more appropriate to Japanese fac­
tor prices and conditions than the technology available from western coun­
tries. 
It should be admitted that Japan had many things going for it besides the 
depreciation of silver--ranging from its heavy emphasis on the incentive­
creating land tax to its rich cultural strength and heritage which was capa­
ble of resisting any unfavorable international demonstration effect on 
savings rates. Nevertheless, the role of exchange depreciation in this 
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growth process would seem to be worthy of greater attention. 
35 
VI. Summary, Conclusions and Some Reservations 
While there has been a voluminous theoretical literature on the immediate 
effects or exchange devaluation, the long-run effects on development effects 
have been almost completely neglected, We have presented a brief outline of 
our own views about the nature of this relationship--emphasizing its effect 
on both the demand and supply side of exports and via exports on (1) tech­
nological change and efficiency, (2) capital formation and (3) employment. 
Although some recent attention has been devoted to the role of exchange rate 
policy in determining export performance, most of these studies have not been 
very successful in isolating this effect. We have argued that one of the 
main difficulties encountered in time series analysis of this kind is the 
fact that, in addition to the positive effect which exchange rate devalua­
tion would be expected to have on exports, in the long run exports would be 
expected to affect exchange rates negatively, thereby plaguinc any such 
analysis with the simultaneous equation bias. 
In an effort to mitigate the influence of this bias, we have chosen to 
study the period between J.874 and 1894 when the currencies of the vast ma­
jority of countries in the world lJere convertible into either one of two 
metals--gold or silver. Since the price of silver in terms of gold fell 
by approximately 50 percent during this period, the silver standard coun­
tries implicitly and automatically devaluated with respect to gold countries 
35Note, however, that Patrick [80] and Baba and Tatemoto [5] have re­
cently devoted considerable attention to the relationship between exchange 
rates and Japanese economic growth in the last 20 years of the 19th century. 
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by an equal amount. Since there were quite a few countries on each standard 
in each region, level of development and other relevant characteristics, a 
comparison of the silver (and paper) standard countries, on the one hand, 
and the gold standard countries, on the other, with respect to export per­
formance and other indicators of development offers many advantages. In 
Section III we argued that previoup studies of these relationships in that 
periodp not all of which yielded results supporting the relationship between 
exchange devaluation and export growth, have suffered from several defects-­
both logical and empirical--which would seem to warrant a reinvestigation 
utilizing an international cross section of individual time series. 
Although most of our attention has been limited to countries at lower 
levels of development, our results provide strong evidence for the generality 
and considerable strength of the relationship between exchange rate devalua­
tion and both export performance and overall development. 
The less developed gold standard countries were generally characterized 
by extremely slow growth of exports and income, which in per capita terms 
meant stagnation or even decline and frequently resulted in financial crisis, 
unemployment and underemployment, excessive substitution of capital for 
labor and of imports for domestic production, and reduced private capital 
inflow to a trickle. 
In contrast, most of the silver standard countries enjoyed a rate of 
growth in exports in both value and volume terms three, four or more times 
that of the gold standard countries. None of the silver standard countries 
suffered from unemployment. Host of the silver countries experienced rapid 
growth in real per capita income, investment booms (assisted by sizeable 
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inflows of foreign capital, labor and managerial capability), and conspicu­
ous improvements in efficiency. 
Some implications of this analysis for theory are (1) that more work 
should go into detailing the various alternative mechanisms by which exchange 
rates affect long-run development and thereby to lay the foundation for fur­
ther empirical work in which it might be possible to establish the relative 
importance of each of these mechanisms, (2) that theoretical and empirical 
investigations are needed in order to establish conditions under which de­
valuations will be most successful and to determine the optimal rate of 
exchange devaluation from the standpoint of development. 
The policy implications would seem to be straightforward: continuous 
exchange rate devaluation can be extremely beneficial to development even 
when a number of other countries devaluate at the same time. In fact, the 
customs union effect of simultaneous devaluation would seem to have been 
strong and healthy. It provides the same benefits of an ordinary customs 
union without some of the political problems and administrative costs that 
go along with common markets. Yet it also provides important incentives 
to extra regional exports. Given the rather bleak prospects for transferring 
sizeable amounts of foreign resources from rich to poor nations, the simul­
taneous and continuous devaluation of LDC currencies with respect to the 
currencies of rich nations would seem to offer an alternative means to the 
same end that is simpler to administer, perhaps more certain to be effective, 
and undoubtedly politically more feasible. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to state several reservations. In the 
first place, we can expect that the last quarter of the 20th century will 
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differ from the same quarter of the 19th century in several important ways: 
(1) Capital and labor were more mobile in the 19th century than they are 
likely to be in the near future. The ability of resources to move 
to the areas of the world in which the incentives for export had been 
created contributed significantly to the success of continuous devalua­
tion. 
(2) In the absence of monthly computations of cost of living indexes, labor 
may have been more vulnerable to a money illusion then than now, there­
by facilitating increases in employment by camouflaged reductions in 
real wages. 
(3) The automaticity of devaluation which make it politically much more 
pallatable might be hard to duplicate in the framework of contemporary 
international and national monetary institutions. 36 
(4) Quantitative restrictions are likely to play a significantly larger 
role in international trade in the next 25 years than they did in the 
period studied in this paper. Such restrictions, of course, limit the 
effectiveness of devaluation. 
Secondly, until it is possible to discriminate more effectively between 
the various mechanisms through which exchange depreciation affects economic 
development, the possibility that the relationship is only spurious shall 
remain. 
Thirdly, a reservation concerning data limitations needs to be stated. 
In as much as the data utilized in this study have been drawn from many 
36For an interesting investigation of the seriousness of the political 
consequences of individual devaluations by less developed countries in 
recent years see Cooper [26). 
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different sources, often of dubious reliability, whose methods and sources 
have not generally been investigated, and as better or more complete data 
become available, the empirical results might well be subject to change. 
Finally, it should be admitted that our estimate of the favorable 
impact of devaluation on development in LDC's is a gross estimate and not 
net of the unfavorable effect which devaluation on the part of the silver 
countries imposed upon the non-devaluating countries. From a world welfare 
point of view, the net effect either on the world as a whole, or even on 
the devaluating countries alone (owing to the limitations which slower 
growth and balance of payments problems in the non-devaluating countries 
would be likely to impose on their ability and willingness to export 
capital) would likely be smaller than the gross effects. Nevertheless, 
trade,which in any case is likely to be increased by the devaluation,is 
undoubtedly a positive sum game and thus the gains of the devaluating coun­
tries in a realistic (dynamic) sense are likely to greatly outweigh the 
loss to the non-devaluating countries. 
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